A Reasonable Belief: In Support of LGBT Plaintiffs\u27 Title VII Retaliation Claims by Buzuvis, Erin E
Western New England University School of Law
Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications
2014
A Reasonable Belief: In Support of LGBT Plaintiffs'
Title VII Retaliation Claims
Erin E. Buzuvis
Western New England University School of Law, ebuzuvis@law.wne.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erin E. Buzuvis, Reasonable Belief: In Support of LGBT Plaintiffs' Title VII Retaliation Claims, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 929 (2014).
929 
A REASONABLE BELIEF: IN SUPPORT OF LGBT 
PLAINTIFFS’ TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS 
ERIN E. BUZUVIS† 
ABSTRACT 
When an LGBT employee is punished for complaining about dis-
crimination in the workplace, he or she has two potential causes of action 
under Title VII: first, a challenge to the underlying discrimination, and 
second, a challenge to the resulting retaliation. The first claim is vulnera-
ble to dismissal under courts’ narrow interpretation of Title VII’s prohi-
bition of discrimination “because of sex” as applied to LGBT plaintiffs. 
But such an outcome need not determine the fate of the second claim. 
Faithful application of retaliation law’s “reasonable belief” standard, 
which protects a plaintiff from reprisal so long as she reasonably be-
lieved that she was complaining about unlawful discrimination, should 
allow LGBT plaintiffs to successfully challenge the reprisal, even if the 
court determines that the underlying discrimination was not “because of 
sex.” This Article provides several arguments in support of such reason-
able belief, in order to strengthen both the law’s protection from retalia-
tion in general as well as the challenges of obtaining relief for workplace 
discrimination against LGBT individuals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the prevalence of discrimination against lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees in the workplace,1 Title VII 
does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation or transgender status. For this reason, until such time 
as Congress changes the law, an LGBT employee who suffers discrimi-
nation on the job must formulate his or her claim as one of sex discrimi-
nation in order to gain relief under federal law. Fortunately, this has been 
possible in many cases. Courts have found Title VII’s prohibition against 
sex discrimination to apply where plaintiffs were targeted for their gen-
der nonconformity2 or change of sex,3 and where the plaintiff was har-
assed in a sexual manner.4 At the same time, LGBT plaintiffs frequently 
run up against the limits of these approaches, such as when courts nar-
rowly interpret the plaintiff’s evidence of gender nonconformity5 or ad-
here to restrictive precedents that foreclose expansive definitions of sex 
discrimination.6 As such, sex discrimination claims are a second-best 
solution for LGBT plaintiffs—an insufficient work-around to the prob-
lem created by Title VII’s omission of sexual orientation and gender 
identity as protected characteristics. 
With a toolbox limited to second-best solutions, it is useful to have 
as many as possible from which to choose. To that end, this Article seeks 
to make a modest contribution to the toolbox by generating support for 
  
 1. Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination 
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing 
for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012). 
 2. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 472 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel v. 
Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 
(6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmedding v. 
Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 3. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210–11 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 4. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); Heller v. Colum-
bia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D. Or. 2002). 
 5. E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting gay 
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because he “failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional 
gender stereotypes in any observable way at work”).  
 6. E.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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another work-around: retaliation claims. Many times, particularly in har-
assment cases, an LGBT employee who suffers discrimination on the job 
also endures reprisals for having reported it. These reprisals ought to 
qualify for protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, even in 
cases where the underlying discrimination does not appear to the court to 
be an instance of actionable sex discrimination. With few exceptions,7 
however, courts often summarily dismiss attendant retaliation claims 
with no further analysis other than to note that the underlying discrimina-
tion was not itself a violation of law.8 This approach flies in the face of 
Supreme Court precedent, which has interpreted Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision to potentially apply in cases where the plaintiff rea-
sonably believes that the complained-of discrimination violates the stat-
ute.9 
There are many reasons why LGBT employees could reasonably 
believe that discrimination about which they complain violates Title VII. 
First, though an erroneous belief, it is widely assumed that a federal ban 
on sexual orientation discrimination already exists.10 This collective as-
sumption likely derives from an increasing number of state-level protec-
tions against discrimination and the well-known political and legislative 
victories in the marriage-equality movement. Second, even if a court 
rejects that it is reasonable to believe that federal law prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation, that court should still be willing 
to consider that an LGBT employee reasonably believed that the com-
plained-of discrimination was actionable sex discrimination. The reason-
ableness of this belief is underscored by the fact that federal courts no 
longer categorically deny sex discrimination claims by LGBT plaintiffs. 
Most circuit courts of appeal have either decided sex discrimination 
claims in favor of an LGBT plaintiff,11 or at least addressed the possibil-
  
 7. E.g., Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2011); McCarthy v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIV. 2:09–2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 4006634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
8, 2011). In McCarthy the court stated: 
There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiffs in this case were reasonable in believing 
that Title VII prohibited defendant from terminating their coworker based on his sexual 
orientation. Not only has there been a growing gay rights movement in this country, the 
courts have also recognized sexual orientation as a status that merits heightened protec-
tion. 
McCarthy, 2011 WL 4006634, at *4 (citation omitted). 
 8. E.g., Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F. App’x 344, 351 (10th Cir. 2012); Gilbert v. 
Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 
Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 
224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 9. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). 
 10. A survey by the Center for American Progress found that “9 of out [sic] 10 voters errone-
ously think that a federal law is already in place protecting gay and transgender people from work-
place discrimination.” Jeff Krehely, Polls Show Huge Public Support for Gay and Transgender 
Workplace Protections, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, June 2, 2011, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9716/polls-show-huge-public-
support-for-gay-and-transgender-workplace-protections/. 
 11. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel 
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 
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ity of doing so in cases where the plaintiff properly alleged and support-
ed a claim based on gender nonconformity.12 Moreover, interpretations 
of Title VII—whether by the courts or, most recently, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)13—are increasingly recog-
nizing the inextricable convergence of sex, sexual orientation, and gen-
der identity.14 Even if the judge in a plaintiff’s case does not think, for 
example, that “faggot” is a gender-based slur,15 it is hardly unreasonable 
for the plaintiff to believe that it is. In laying out support for an LGBT 
plaintiff’s reasonable belief in the illegality of the underlying discrimina-
tion, this Article hopes to strengthen the potential for retaliation claims to 
be successful in general, and in particular for those plaintiffs who would 
otherwise be without recourse under Title VII. 
Part I of this Article will first explain briefly why, despite courts’ 
expanding interpretations of sex discrimination, Title VII’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination remains a limited remedy for workplace discrimi-
nation against LGBT employees. Part II examines Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision and the reasonable belief doctrine and provides ex-
amples of retaliation cases predicated on anti-LGBT discrimination. Fi-
nally, Part III provides support for LGBT plaintiffs’ reasonable belief 
that underlying discrimination is unlawful. 
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AS SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS FOR 
LGBT PLAINTIFFS 
Notwithstanding their vulnerability to bias and harassment on the 
job, Title VII only offers limited protection to LGBT employees. As this 
Part will describe, early judicial interpretations of Title VII foreclosed 
interpretations that would have extended the statute’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination to also include discrimination based on homosexuality or 
transgender status per se. The Supreme Court’s 1989 ruling in Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins16 has provided relief to some LGBT plaintiffs, but 
only in cases where discrimination based on gender nonconformity, read 
narrowly, is also present. Notwithstanding the more robust view of sex 
discrimination that is emerging from the EEOC, the courts generally  
  
578 (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmed-
ding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 12. E.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 265 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 13. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 14. Henderson v. Labor Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *4 (E.D. 
Va. Apr. 2, 2013) (“Stereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often 
necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.” (quoting Howell v. N. Cent. 
Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Centola v. 
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Sexual orientation harassment is often, if not 
always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.”). 
 15. E.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060, 1067–68 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 16. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
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have yet to embrace this view. Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination thus 
remains a second-best solution to employers’ discrimination against 
LGBT employees. 
A. Early Courts Foreclose Broad Interpretations of Sex Discrimination 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal employment 
discrimination statute, prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, firing, 
or otherwise discriminating against any individual “because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”17 It does not ex-
pressly enumerate sexual orientation or gender identity as protected 
characteristics, and some early judicial decisions under Title VII inter-
preted this omission to exclude LGBT plaintiffs from the protections of 
the statute. For example, in 1979, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
deciding DeSantis v. Pacific Telegraph & Telephone Co.,18 rejected sev-
eral arguments that sought to position sexual orientation discrimination 
as a subset of sex discrimination, including the argument that discrimina-
tion against a male employee who chooses male sexual partners is sex 
discrimination in that it treats him differently from a female employee 
who also chooses a male sexual partner, as well as the argument that 
sexual orientation discrimination relies on stereotypes about hegemonic 
masculinity.19 The court reasoned that any argument that renders all sex-
ual orientation discrimination to fall within the ambit of sex discrimina-
tion would have constituted impermissible “bootstrap[ping]” by defying 
Congress’s intentional exclusion of sexual orientation as a protected 
characteristic under Title VII.20 Five years later, the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines21 created a similar categorical ex-
clusion for transgender plaintiffs. In that case, the court dismissed a case 
against an airline that fired a pilot after discovering that she had had sex 
reassignment surgery. The court rejected Ulane’s argument that the dis-
crimination she endured was “because of . . . sex,” either as discrimina-
tion against Ulane because of her female sex or because of her change of 
sex.22 Both arguments would have required the court to interpret sex to 
mean something other than biological sex—an interpretation the court 
believed was foreclosed by congressional intent. 
B. Price Waterhouse Offers Some Relief to LGBT Plaintiffs 
The Supreme Court’s later decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
rejected a narrow reading of sex discrimination and provided new am-
munition for LGBT plaintiffs to challenge discrimination in the work-
place. In that case, the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, had been passed over for 
  
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
 18. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).  
 19. Id. at 330. 
 20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 22. Id. at 1084, 1087. 
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promotion in her accounting firm because the partners thought she was 
too aggressive for a woman.23 The Court viewed this as impermissible 
sex discrimination because the employer’s practice of rewarding aggres-
siveness in men while objecting to aggressive women placed Hopkins in 
an “intolerable and impermissible catch 22.”24 With this conclusion, the 
Court suggested an expanded definition of sex that includes not just 
whether someone is male or female, but also how one presents one’s 
gender.25  
Lower courts have come to read Price Waterhouse for the proposi-
tion that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against em-
ployees who do not conform to stereotyped notions of masculinity and 
femininity. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,26 the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that its earlier holding in DeSantis was at least partially 
abrogated by Price Waterhouse when it held an employer liable for har-
assment that targeted a male employee because of his gender noncon-
formity.27 Though the plaintiff in that case was not identified as gay, the 
nature of the harassment he endured suggested that his co-workers per-
ceived him to be so; they called him “she” and other “vulgar name[s] . . . 
cast in female terms[,]” taunted him for effeminate mannerisms, and 
teased him for not sleeping with a female co-worker.28 Like the Ninth 
Circuit, most courts have similarly held that Title VII prohibits anti-gay 
harassment that demonstrably targets the plaintiff’s gender nonconformi-
ty.29 
Price Waterhouse also created a potential Title VII remedy for 
transgender employees who endure discrimination on the job. In Smith v. 
City of Salem,30 for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
that an employer’s adverse treatment of a transgender employee who had 
begun to express his female gender identity on the job was prohibited by 
Title VII because it targeted the plaintiff for failing to conform to stereo-
types consonant with the sex (male) they perceived the plaintiff to be.31 
In so holding, the court acknowledged that earlier precedent such as 
  
 23. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 24. Id. at 251. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 27. Id. at 874–75. 
 28. Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel 
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. 
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261–62 (1st Cir. 1999); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 
187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 
1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
 30. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 31. Id. at 574–75. 
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Ulane had been eviscerated by the Court’s decision in Price Water-
house.32 Other courts have ruled similarly.33 
C. Narrow Interpretations of Price Waterhouse Foreclose Relief to Many 
LGBT Plaintiffs 
Despite broadening the scope of actionable sex discrimination, the 
sex-stereotyping argument created by Price Waterhouse offers only lim-
ited protection to LGBT plaintiffs. Most significantly for gay and lesbian 
plaintiffs, courts apply Price Waterhouse only to gender-nonconforming 
behavior or appearance that is visible on the job.34 A remnant of the anti-
bootstrapping rationale, this limitation precludes gay and lesbian plain-
tiffs from arguing that homosexuality per se is a departure from sex ste-
reotypes that is protected from discrimination.35 This limitation ensures 
that only gay and lesbian plaintiffs who are visibly gender-
nonconforming—a gay male with effeminate mannerisms, or a lesbian 
with masculine ones—can potentially allege an actionable claim of sex 
discrimination. 
Gay and lesbian plaintiffs also have difficulty proving that the dis-
crimination they experienced was based on sex. Some courts view anti-
gay bias as an alternative to gender-based motivation for harassment, and 
do not see them as overlapping or related. In these courts, evidence of 
anti-gay animus—plaintiff was called a faggot, for example—reflects a 
singular homophobic motive for harassment that forecloses the possibil-
ity that the plaintiff’s gender was also a target.36 With few exceptions,37 
  
 32. Id. at 573. 
 33. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005); Lopez v. River Oaks 
Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (examining action brought 
by transsexual male-to-female (MTF) plaintiff whose job offer was revoked after she came to the 
interview presenting as a woman);  Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 
WL 34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001); see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that discrimination against a transgender plaintiff is sex discrimination for 
purposes of applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that “[a] person 
is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses 
gender stereotypes”). 
 34. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
argument that “his supposed sexual practices, [where] he behaved more like a woman” could qualify 
as actionable sex-stereotyping under Price Waterhouse); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 
211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to show that she was discrimi-
nated against for her gender nonconforming appearance, rather than her sexual orientation). 
 35. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218. The court stated:  
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, . . . gender stereotyping claims can 
easily present problems for an adjudicator. This is for the simple reason that 
“[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often necessarily 
blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.” Like other courts, we have 
therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used to “bootstrap 
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”  
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004); 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 36. Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 F. App’x 48, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting 
plaintiff’s harassment as being related to his sexual orientation rather than gender, where plaintiff 
was called a “faggot” and other slurs, but was also told “[a] real man in the corporate world would 
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courts have generally not embraced the view that anti-gay harassment is 
the means by which some workplace environments police gender 
norms.38 
The limits of Price Waterhouse are made more significant when 
viewed in the context of courts’ reluctance, since Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,39 to find that the sexual nature of harassment 
satisfies the requirement that harassment be motivated by the victim’s 
sex. In Oncale, the Court rejected the idea that same-sex harassment was 
categorically excluded from protection under Title VII, in contradiction 
to some lower courts that had so held.40 However, the Court went on to 
emphasize that a plaintiff still needs to demonstrate that harassment was 
motivated by sex, such as by offering evidence that (1) the harasser is 
homosexual, and therefore motivated by sexual desire; (2) the harasser is 
generally hostile to the presence of the plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; 
or (3) the harasser in a mixed-sex workplace singles out one sex for har-
assing treatment.41 Notably, the Court did not suggest that the highly 
sexualized nature of harassment could also satisfy this burden; if it had, 
the Court would not have had to remand Oncale’s case on this question, 
since his allegations—that co-workers restrained him while one placed 
his penis on Oncale’s neck and arm, that they threatened to rape him, and 
that they forcibly pushed a bar of soap into his anus while he was show-
  
not come to work with an earring in his ear. But I guess you will never be a ‘real man’!!!!!!” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
plaintiff repeatedly called “faggot” and other gay slurs did not allege gender nonconformity claim 
under Price Waterhouse); see Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000); 
EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *17 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 28, 2008); Mowery v. Escambia Cnty. Utils. Auth., No. 3:04CV382-RS-EMT, 2006 WL 
327965, at *7 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (“Being forty years old, owning a home and truck, living alone, and 
not discussing one’s sexual partners are not feminine gender traits. These characteristics may reflect 
stereotypes associated with a homosexual lifestyle, but they are not stereotypes associated with a 
feminine gender.”); see also Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287, 
312, 314 (2011) (criticizing this approach and arguing that unprotected traits like sexual orientation 
should be neutral for purposes of a sex discrimination claim). 
 37. E.g., Henderson v. Labor Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *1–
2, *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2013); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Sexual 
orientation harassment is often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually de-
fined gender norms. In fact, stereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes 
about the proper roles of men and women.”). 
 38. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role 
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 633 (1992) 
(“Homophobia is both a symptom and a primary weapon of gender discrimination; any serious 
attempt to attain gender equality must aim to remove it.”); Kramer, supra note 36, at 313; Vicki 
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1776–77 (1998); Richard F. 
Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in Employment Discrimination, 55 
ME. L. REV. 118, 142 (2002). 
 39. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 40. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523 
U.S. 75 (1998); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated by 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75, 77; see also Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After 
Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 692–93 (1998) 
(describing the legal landscape for same-sex harassment prior to Oncale). 
 41. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81. 
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ering—clearly would have qualified.42 With one notable exception,43 the 
courts have generally been reluctant to conclude after Oncale that the 
sexualized nature of harassing conduct can support a claim that same-sex 
harassment is motivated by the victim’s sex—an unfortunate limitation 
for gay employees who are particularly vulnerable to same-sex harass-
ment. For example, in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,44 the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals denied that the plaintiff, a gay man, had en-
dured harassment because of sex where the harassment, while sexual in 
nature, did not reflect the harasser’s sexual desire, general hostility to-
wards men, or differential treatment towards men.45 While courts gener-
ally do allow gay plaintiffs to use gender nonconformity as the basis for 
arguing that harassment targets them because of sex, cases like Vickers 
show that the limitations of this doctrine often leave gay plaintiffs with-
out any remedy at all.46 
Price Waterhouse is also a limited remedy for discrimination 
against transgender employees in that courts may potentially apply it 
only to situations like in Smith, where the employee begins to transition 
on the job and is targeted for discrimination for dressing or behaving in 
ways that belie the employee’s natal sex. As with homosexuality, most 
courts are unwilling to consider being transgender per se as gender non-
conformity. While many cases of discrimination against a transgender 
employee will also involve discrimination for failing to appear and be-
have in accordance with natal sex stereotypes, and thus be actionable, 
some cases will fall outside of this zone of overlap. Discrimination that 
targets a transgender employee whose transgender identity is discovered 
(or disclosed) but who does not (or not yet) appear as their affirmed sex 
at work may not be prohibited under Price Waterhouse.47 And even in 
  
 42. Id. at 82; Oncale, 83 F.3d. at 118–19. 
 43. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(concluding that plaintiff’s allegations of “physical conduct of a sexual nature” state a cause of 
action for sexual harassment under Title VII (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Edward J. 
Reeves & Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protections in 
the Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 L. & SEXUALITY 61, 68 (2011) (pointing out the unique 
nature of the Rene decision). 
 44. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 45. Id. at 765. 
 46. Id. at 763; McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Reeves & Decker, supra note 43, at 68–69; 
Kavita B. Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted Sexual Advances: A Study of 
the Homosexual Advance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 26 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 337–39 (2011) (pointing out that heterosexual men have an 
easier time prevailing on same-sex harassment claims than queer men). 
 47. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006). The court stated: 
A transsexual plaintiff might successfully state a Price Waterhouse-type claim if the 
claim is that he or she has been discriminated against because of a failure to act or appear 
masculine or feminine enough for an employer . . . but such a claim must actually arise 
from the employee's appearance or conduct and the employer's stereotypical perceptions. 
Such a claim is not stated here, where the complaint alleges that Schroer's non-selection 
was the direct result of her disclosure of her gender dysphoria and of her intention to 
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cases where a transgender employee is dressing or behaving in a manner 
that belies stereotypes of his or her natal sex, courts may not agree that 
this was the employer’s motivation for discrimination.48 For instance, the 
plaintiff in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority49 was a transgender bus driv-
er who, while on the job, had begun the process of transitioning from 
male to female.50 She sued the transit authority, which fired her when she 
did not agree to refrain from using women’s bathrooms along her route.51 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her argument that 
using a women’s bathroom on the job was gender nonconforming behav-
ior that was protected from discrimination under Price Waterhouse.52 As 
such, the employer could rely on its concern about bathroom usage as a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in satisfaction of its burden under 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.53 
Even in cases where the gender nonconformity theory could poten-
tially apply, it is not always the plaintiff’s desired approach, since it can 
be undermining to a transgender plaintiff’s gender identity to have to 
seek relief as a nonconforming member of their natal, rather than af-
firmed, sex.54 It also validates gender stereotypes as such, since describ-
  
begin presenting herself as a woman, or her display of photographs of herself in feminine 
attire, or both. 
Id. (citation omitted). The court went on to deny the employer’s motion to dismiss anyway, and later 
concluded after trial that the plaintiff had presented evidence of discrimination based on gender 
nonconformity. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Oiler v. 
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00–3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *2 (E.D. La. 2002) (employer 
terminated transgender employee after learning the employee identified as transgender and cross-
dressed outside of work); Jason Lee, Note, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying 
Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 441 
(2012). 
 48. Mary Kristen Kelly, Note, (Trans)forming Traditional Interpretations of Title VII: “Be-
cause of Sex” and the Transgender Dilemma, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 219, 230 (2010) 
(citing Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 182 Fed. App’x 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2006)) (describing a case in 
which a transgender plaintiff’s harassment claim was dismissed “because the only evidence she was 
able to show was that her supervisor referred to her as a ‘he/she,’ which,” while offensive, did not 
constitute evidence of the harasser’s animus towards her gender nonconformity). 
 49. 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 50. Id. at 1218–19. 
 51. Id. at 1219. 
 52. Id. at 1224. 
 53. Id. McDonnell Douglas allows a plaintiff to satisfy the requirement of proving discrimina-
tory intent based on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of such motive. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). A plaintiff who satisfies the elements of a prima facie 
case shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse em-
ployment action, which the plaintiff may rebut with evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason is 
pretext for discrimination. Id. In Etsitty, the court assumed without deciding that the plaintiff had 
met her burden to satisfy the prima facie case. 502 F.3d at 1224. After accepting the transit authori-
ty’s rationale as legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the court then determined that Etsitty had not 
proffered evidence sufficient to show that the bathroom usage rationale was pretext for discrimina-
tion based on sex/gender nonconformity. Id. at 1227. 
 54. Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651, 666 (2009) (“Our difficulty with the Smith case is that the court reduces 
Smith’s transgender identity to little more than a fashion choice to wear women’s clothing.”); Kelly, 
supra note 48, at 230; Sharon M. McGowan, Working with Clients to Develop Compatible Visions of 
What It Means to “Win” a Case: Reflections on Schroer v. Billington, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
205, 205 (2010) (quoting Diane Schroer as saying, “I haven’t gone through all this only to have a 
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ing a person’s behavior or appearance as gender nonconforming implies 
there is a “correct” gender for whatever behavior or appearance is at is-
sue.55 This might not feel right to some transgender plaintiffs, particular-
ly if their gender identity is outside the gender binary altogether. 
D. Emerging Alternatives to Price Waterhouse 
Because of these limitations, it is promising that alternative inter-
pretations of Title VII’s application to transgender plaintiffs have begun 
to emerge. In 2008, a district court judge in Washington, D.C. interpreted 
the statute’s ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination on the 
basis of one’s transsexuality. In that case, Schroer v. Billington,56 the 
Library of Congress revoked a job offer it had made to “David” Schroer 
(later Diane) when she disclosed her transgender status and intent to start 
work as a woman.57 In the lawsuit that followed, the judge ruled in her 
favor on two alternative grounds. First, the court applied Price Water-
house to find that the discrimination against Schroer was discrimination 
because of sex, relying on evidence that the hiring supervisor was un-
comfortable with the fact that someone she had come to know as a man 
would be wearing a dress and presenting as a woman in contravention of 
stereotyped masculinity.58 Then the court went on to hold that even in the 
absence of sex stereotyping, the employer had violated Title VII because 
refusing to hire someone who changes their sex targets that person be-
cause of sex.59 It is therefore sex discrimination in the same sense that 
refusing to hire someone because they have converted from one religion 
to another is discrimination on the basis of religion.60 The reasoning in 
this opinion extends a broader range of protection to transgender plain-
tiffs than Price Waterhouse would alone because it is available to 
  
court vindicate my rights as a gender non-conforming man” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Storrow, supra note 38, at 149–50. 
 55. Devi Rao, Gender Identity Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination: Protecting Transgender 
Students from Bullying and Harassment Using Title IX, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 245, 252, 263 
(2013); cf. Judith Butler, Appearances Aside, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 62 (2000) (“Antidiscrimination 
law participates in the very practices it seeks to regulate; antidiscrimination law can become an 
instrument of discrimination in the sense that it must reiterate—and entrench—the stereotypical or 
discriminatory version of the social category it seeks to eliminate.”). 
 56. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 57. Id. at 295–99. 
 58. Id. at 305. The judge in this case had, in an earlier decision, acknowledged the potential 
limitations of framing the discrimination in Schroer’s case as that of gender nonconformity: 
Schroer is not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She seeks to express her 
female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a woman. She does not wish to go 
against the gender grain, but with it. She has embraced the cultural mores dictating that 
“Diane” is a female name and that women wear feminine attire. The problem she faces is 
not because she does not conform to the Library’s stereotypes about how men and wom-
en should look and behave—she adopts those norms. Rather, her problems stem from the 
Library’s intolerance toward a person like her, whose gender identity does not match her 
anatomical sex. 
Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210–11 (D.D.C. 2006). The court went on to deny the 
Library’s motion to dismiss anyway. Id. at 213. 
 59. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 307–08. 
 60. Id. at 306. 
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transgender plaintiffs even in the absence of evidence that the employer’s 
motivation for discrimination was the plaintiff’s gender nonconformity 
rather than her transsexuality per se.61 
While Schroer’s “change of sex” rationale has yet to be cited by 
other federal courts, the EEOC incorporated its rationale into a decision 
that broadly construed the agency’s jurisdiction to investigate claims of 
sex discrimination filed by transgender employees. In Macy v. Holder,62 
the EEOC determined that a transgender applicant who was rejected for a 
job with a federal agency had successfully alleged a complaint of sex 
discrimination.63 The EEOC employed a broad reading of Price Water-
house to conclude that gender nonconformity includes not only visibly 
transitioning on the job, as in Smith, but even simply identifying as 
transgender.64 Moreover, the EEOC held that transgender plaintiffs were 
not limited to alleging claims of sex discrimination based only on the 
gender nonconformity approach.65 An employer who discriminates be-
cause an employee changes sex or identifies as transgender has “relied 
on [the employee’s] gender in making its decision,” which is prohibited 
under Title VII.66 
The EEOC’s decision employs a broad definition of sex discrimina-
tion—broader than any courts have used to date. While it is likely to be 
influential on the courts, the extent of this influence remains to be seen. 
Many courts will likely defer to it as a well-reasoned interpretation of 
Title VII. However, Macy’s status as an adjudicatory decision that is 
technically only binding on the federal sector does not necessarily re-
quire courts to extend deference in cases involving private employers.67 
As a result, courts could still reject it on grounds that it conflicts with 
earlier precedent from the Ulane line of cases that foreclose Title VII 
protection from discrimination because of one’s transgender status. 
II. TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND LGBT PLAINTIFFS’ 
REASONABLE BELIEFS 
As the previous Part makes clear, Title VII offers LGBT plaintiffs 
limited means to redress direct instances of employment discrimination. 
As this Part will show, LGBT plaintiffs have also had limited success 
pursuing retaliation claims in cases where the predicate discrimination 
  
 61. See generally Lee, supra note 47. 
 62. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 63. Id. at *1. 
 64. Id. at *7–8. 
 65. Id. at *10. 
 66. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 67. Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 65 
ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 437 (2013) (“Similarly, EEOC adjudicatory decisions are granted some judicial 
deference, and although they are not binding on anyone outside the federal sector, they are often 
treated as indications of what will constitute ‘good practice’ in the future.”). 
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was not itself unlawful. As explained in this Part, courts have taken an 
increasingly narrow view of conduct that is protected under Title VII’s 
prohibition against retaliation. Notwithstanding critiques of this prob-
lematic approach, it has been employed in cases involving gay plaintiffs. 
Yet, the fact that some courts have read the law to offer broader protec-
tion against gay and other LGBT plaintiffs suggests and lays the 
groundwork for a more promising alternative approach. 
A. Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision 
Protection against retaliation is essential to the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws.68 Without it, whistleblowers would be reluctant to 
report and seek remedies to redress discrimination.69 Accordingly, Con-
gress included express statutory language in Title VII that prohibits em-
ployers from retaliating against employees who complain, whether for-
mally or informally, about discrimination made unlawful by the statute.70 
However, courts have long held that a plaintiff may prevail under Ti-
tle VII’s anti-retaliation provision even if the conduct complained of 
(i.e., the predicate discrimination) is not actually unlawful.71 As Profes-
sor Brake explains, “[p]rotection from retaliation would mean little if it 
were otherwise.”72 Most employees do not have specific knowledge 
about discrimination law, and even those who do would be hard pressed 
to predict how judges and juries would apply that law in a specific case.73 
If protection from retaliation was contingent on the employee guessing 
right in the face of such uncertainty, many would avoid the risky act of 
whistleblowing.74 
  
 68. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005) (interpreting Title IX’s 
implied right of action to include retaliation claims, even though such protections are not expressly 
contained in the statute); see also Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 377–78 (2010). 
 69. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25–26 (2005). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this [subchapter], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [subchap-
ter]. 
The two clauses defining protected conduct under this provision are generally known as the opposi-
tion clause and the participation clause, respectively. See, e.g., DIANNE AVERY ET AL., 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 
165, 168 (8th ed. 2010).  
 71. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004–06 (5th Cir. 1969); Sias v. City 
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (extending this rationale to the opposition 
clause as well by reasoning that EEOC enforcement “would be severely chilled” if Title VII’s pro-
tection against retaliation under the participation clause only applied to meritorious EEOC com-
plaints). 
 72. Brake, supra note 69, at 76. 
 73. Id. at 76–77. 
 74. Id. at 77; Pizer et al., supra note 1, at 734 (“LGBT employees are often reluctant to pursue 
claims for fear of retaliation or of ‘outing’ themselves further in their workplace.”). 
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B. The Reasonable Belief Standard 
When an employee complains of discrimination in the context of a 
formal EEOC proceeding, the employee is generally protected from re-
taliation as long as the underlying complaint is not false or malicious.75 
However, in informal contexts, such as an internal complaint to the em-
ployer, an employee’s protection is more narrow, extending only to situa-
tions where the employee has a good faith, reasonable belief that the 
predicate discrimination is unlawful.76 Early courts applied this standard 
to broaden, not narrow, the range of conduct protected from retaliation. 
Compared to the possible alternative of requiring plaintiffs to prove that 
the underlying discrimination was unlawful,77 the “reasonable belief” 
standard allowed for robust protection against retaliation while still en-
suring employers’ freedom to address “malicious accusations and frivo-
lous claims.”78 Increasingly, however, courts are raising the bar on what 
constitutes a reasonable belief and using that requirement as grounds to 
deny plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.79 
For example, in Clark County School District v. Breeden,80 the Su-
preme Court denied a plaintiff’s retaliation claim after noting that “no 
one could reasonably believe that the [alleged predicate discrimination] 
violated Title VII.”81 In that case, an employee alleged that she was 
transferred as punishment for complaining internally about sexual har-
assment arising from a one-time, situation-appropriate exchange in 
which a supervisor repeated another person’s sexual comment in the 
plaintiff’s presence.82 Because sexual harassment must be “severe or 
  
 75. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007. But see Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much Into What 
the Court Doesn’t Write: How Some Federal Courts Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s 
Protections After Clark County School District v. Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345, 357 (2008) 
(describing several cases that have, post-Breeden, imposed a “reasonable belief” requirement for 
retaliation cases under the participation clause as well (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 76. See, e.g., Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982). The 
court stated: 
The mistake must, of course, be a sincere one; and presumably it must be reasonable . . . 
for it seems unlikely that the framers of Title VII would have wanted to encourage the fil-
ing of utterly baseless charges by preventing employers from disciplining the employees 
who made them. But it is good faith and reasonableness, not the fact of discrimination, 
that is the critical inquiry in a retaliation case. 
Id. 
 77. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2007). 
 78. Id. at 1472 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)). 
 79. Moberly, supra note 68, at 448. 
 80. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
 81. Id. at 270. 
 82. Id. at 269. Specifically, the plaintiff complained about an exchange that occurred when 
she, her supervisor, and “another male employee” were meeting to review reports about four indi-
viduals who had applied for a job with the school district. Id. The report on one of the applicants 
recounted that he had:  
[O]nce commented to a co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the 
Grand Canyon.” . . . [T]he [plaintiff’s] supervisor read the comment aloud, [and then] 
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pervasive” in order to be actionable, the Court refused to recognize that 
the plaintiff’s complaint about a seemingly minor incident warranted 
protection from retaliation.83 
Other cases since Breeden have also denied protection from retalia-
tion to plaintiffs who complained about harassment that they could not 
have reasonably believed was severe or pervasive, including in cases 
where the predicate harassment was arguably more serious than what 
Breeden herself had challenged.84 Retaliation plaintiffs have been 
thwarted by other mistakes of law regarding the predicate discrimination 
as well.85 
C. Critiques of the Narrowing of Reasonable Belief  
Critics have argued that Breeden’s narrow reading of the reasonable 
belief standard threatens to undermine the enforcement-enhancing pur-
pose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.86 Professor Rosenthal ar-
gues that it “forces employees to essentially become employment law 
experts before deciding whether to report behavior they believe is unlaw-
ful.”87 Professor Brake takes this point further, arguing that—especially 
as to mistakes about whether harassment is pervasive—“[t]he problem is 
not simply that most people lack the legal expertise to ascertain where 
that line begins and ends, but that the uncertainties of litigation prevent 
such a determination from being made in advance.”88 In other legal con-
texts, courts do not require a “reasonable person” to have expertise she or 
he does not have reason to possess,89 and such requirements in retaliation 
  
stated, “I don’t know what that means.” The other employee then said, “Well, I’ll tell you 
later,” and both men chuckled. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 270–71 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)). 
 84. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2006) (black plaintiff 
suffered reprisals and was ultimately fired for reporting an employee who said, in the wake of the 
capture of the D.C. sniper, “They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of 
black apes and let the apes f—k them” (internal quotation marks omitted)); George v. Leavitt, 407 
F.3d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (black female plaintiff from Trinidad alleged she was punished after 
reporting insulting and demeaning statements of her co-workers: “On different occasions, she was 
told by three separate employees to ‘go back to Trinidad’ . . . . On these and other occasions, her co-
workers shouted at her, told her that she should never have been hired, and told her to ‘shut up.’”). 
 85. Outside of the employment context, an appellate court held that a plaintiff was not pro-
tected from retaliation because he had complained about employer practices that had a disparate 
impact based on race, a cause of action that had earlier been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Title VI’s implied private right of action. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 310, 315 
(4th Cir. 2003). 
 86. Brake, supra note 69, at 81–83; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The 
Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title 
VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1130 (2007). 
 87. Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1131; see also Gorod, supra note 77, at 1492–93. 
 88. Brake, supra note 69, at 89. 
 89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 cmt. f (1965) (“If the actor has special 
knowledge, he is required to utilize it, but he is not required to possess such knowledge, unless he 
holds himself out as possessing it or undertakes a course of conduct which a reasonable man would 
recognize as requiring it.”); Gorod, supra note 77, at 1495 n.114 (contrasting the narrowing view of 
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cases evoke harsh consequences on a complaining employee who gets it 
wrong. If she complains too soon, before the harassment has become 
pervasive, then she is vulnerable to retaliation for which she cannot turn 
to Title VII for redress. If she complains too late, once the harassment 
has become pervasive, she must not only endure additional harassment,90 
but she may also be unable to prevail on the other elements of an eventu-
al harassment claim, for two reasons. For one, her employer can argue 
that her failure to complain suggests that the harassment was not “unwel-
come,” one of the required elements for actionable harassment.91 The 
employer can also argue that the employee’s failure to complain sooner 
was unreasonable, which gives rise to an employer’s affirmative defense 
against vicarious liability for harassment committed by a supervisor.92 
Narrow interpretations of reasonable belief threaten employers’ interests 
as well. When employees are deterred from complaining about problems 
in the workplace, employers lack the information they require to stop 
small problems from becoming big ones that deplete employee produc-
tivity and morale. Fearing retaliation, employees who would have other-
wise complained internally may also choose instead to file formal EEOC 
complaints, which are costlier and more time-consuming to defend.93 
For these reasons, some have argued that the courts should abandon 
the requirement that the plaintiff’s belief be objectively reasonable, leav-
ing in place only the requirement of a good faith belief.94 Employers 
would still be able to take adverse action against an employee who has 
filed malicious or frivolous claims and, in the rest of cases, can protect 
themselves against retaliation claims by refraining from taking punitive 
action against a good faith complainant. This approach, while sensible, 
may be unfeasible given the widespread adoption of the reasonable belief 
standard in the wake of the Supreme Court’s endorsement in Breeden.95 
Plaintiffs may have better outcomes by making stronger arguments about 
the reasonableness of their beliefs. In this spirit, other critics advocate for 
pushing the boundaries of what ought to constitute a reasonable belief for 
the purposes of demarking conduct protected from retaliation. Professor 
Brake proposes that courts shift the vantage point of reasonableness from 
that of someone with knowledge of the law to that of an ordinary em-
  
a reasonable mistake in retaliation law to the much more generous view of reasonable mistake that 
applies to defendants claiming qualified immunity). 
 90. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting) (point-
ing out this “Catch-22”).  
 91. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1489; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1159–60. An employer may 
avoid liability for a supervisor’s harassment if (1) the employer has taken reasonable care to prevent 
and correct harassment, and (2) it was unreasonable for employee not to avail herself of employer’s 
prevention/correction opportunities. E.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 93. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1507–08; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1164–65. 
 94. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1500; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1149.  
 95. Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1135, 1138 (describing how Breeden motivated some courts 
to adopt an objective test). 
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ployee.96 She also suggests that courts could set limits on the reasonable 
belief standard by asking “whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case 
that the practices opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of dis-
crimination law.”97 Another commentator suggests reforming how the 
reasonable belief standard applies to cases of predicate harassment in 
particular by accepting that an employee reasonably believes that an iso-
lated incident of harassment is unlawful if the incident, when repeated, 
would constitute a Title VII violation.98 As explained in Part III, cases 
involving retaliation against LGBT plaintiffs who have complained of 
harassment are particularly useful for advancing robust and persuasive 
arguments for broadening the reasonable belief doctrine along the lines 
these commentators have proposed. In addition to helping LGBT plain-
tiffs find relief under a law that does not provide direct protection, a fo-
cus on these cases could lead the push back on this encroaching doctrine. 
D. Judicial Decisions Ignoring Gay Plaintiffs’ Reasonable Belief 
Recently, LGBT plaintiffs have been among those whose retaliation 
claims have been victims of the narrowing reasonable belief doctrine. 
For example, in Larson v. United Air Lines,99 a gay customer service 
manager alleged that he was furloughed by the airline in retaliation for 
complaining about anonymous letters that he perceived to be disparaging 
him because of his sexual orientation.100 Affirming the lower court’s 
dismissal of this claim, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument that Larson’s complaint amounted to protected conduct.101 
Without citing Breeden or mentioning the reasonable belief standard, the 
court required retaliation plaintiffs to demonstrate their “opposition to a 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII.”102 Since 
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, the court reasoned, Larson’s conduct was not protected from retalia-
tion under Title VII.103 
  
 96. Brake, supra note 69, at 103.  
 97. Id. Similarly, another recommendation is to maintain the objective standard but to evalu-
ate the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief based on the “totality of circumstances”—including 
among other factors whether the courts and other authorities are unanimous about whether particular 
conduct violates Title VII. Matthew W. Green, Jr., What’s So Reasonable about Reasonableness? 
Rejecting a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 759, 799–800 (2014). 
 98. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1497–98. 
 99. 482 F. App’x 344 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 100. Id. at 345–46. 
 101. Id. at 350. 
 102. Id. at 351 (quoting Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).  
 103. Id. The court also rejected the argument that the predicate was discriminatory, since the 
first anonymous letter was severely dealt with by the airline (leaving Larson no discrimination to 
complain about), and the second letter did not specifically reference Larson or expressly evince 
hostility towards his sexual orientation. Id. Additionally, the court determined that Larson had not 
demonstrated a causal connection between his complaints about the letters and his eventual furlough, 
since those who had taken his complaint were not involved in the furlough decision. Id. 
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Similarly, in Gilbert v. Country Music Association,104 the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an openly gay union 
member’s claim that his union withheld referrals because he complained 
that a fellow union member had “called him a ‘faggot’ and threatened to 
stab him.”105 First, the court determined that the predicate harassment 
was not actionable sexual harassment.106 Though the court recognized 
that Title VII protects against harassment motivated by the victim’s fail-
ure to conform to gender stereotypes, the victim’s same-sex orientation 
does not itself qualify as nonconforming behavior.107 Rather, the plaintiff 
must be targeted for gender nonconformity in his “‘behavior observed at 
work or affecting his job performance,’ such as his ‘appearance or man-
nerisms on the job,’”108 which the plaintiff in this case did not allege.109 
Then, having concluded that the predicate harassment was motivated by 
sexual orientation rather than sex, the court dispensed Gilbert’s retalia-
tion claim in a single sentence.110 Giving no consideration to whether he 
could have reasonably believed that the harassment was actionable, the 
court dismissed the retaliation claim for the simple reason that Gilbert 
had opposed conduct that was not itself prohibited by Title VII.111 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also rejected a gay plain-
tiff’s retaliation claim. In Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care 
Center, Inc.,112 the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job 
as a nurse because he complained about a supervising doctor’s harassing 
comments.113 After a trial, the lower court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the hospital, which Hamner appealed.114 The Seventh Circuit 
analyzed lengthy excerpts of Hamner’s trial testimony about the nature 
of the internal grievance he had filed.115 Despite Hamner’s testimony that 
he believed the doctor’s conduct—which included mocking him by lisp-
ing and making limp wrists—was harassment because of sex, the court 
read the trial transcript to support the lower court’s conclusion that the 
doctor’s “homophobia” motivated Hamner’s complaint.116 Yet even 
though the court concluded that this predicate harassment was not ac-
tionable under Title VII, the court went on to consider whether, for pur-
  
 104. 432 Fed. App’x 516 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 105. Id. at 518, 521. 
 106. Id. at 519. 
 107. Id. at 519–20. 
 108. Id. at 519 (quoting Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 109. Id. at 520 (rejecting the plaintiff’s allegation that “homosexual males did not conform to 
[the harasser’s] male stereotypes” as an insufficient “formulaic recitation” of the gender noncon-
formity element (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 113. Id. at 703. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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poses of his retaliation claim, Hamner reasonably believed otherwise.117 
To this end, the court required that to be reasonable, the plaintiff’s com-
plaint must at least fall into a category of discrimination that is covered 
by Title VII, and Hamner’s complaint, having been construed to be about 
sexual orientation rather than sex, did not qualify.118 
While these three cases reach the same result, the depth of the 
courts’ respective analyses range in their complexity. The Tenth Circuit 
denied the gay plaintiff’s retaliation claim simply because Title VII does 
not cover sexual orientation.119 The Sixth Circuit at least considered the 
possibility that the gay plaintiff might have suffered discrimination on 
the basis of sex, but then rejected the retaliation claim without bothering 
to distinguish the plaintiff’s reasonable belief from the court’s conclusion 
that he did not.120 Finally, the Seventh Circuit did distinguish between 
actionable harassment and harassment a plaintiff reasonably could have 
believed was so, but nevertheless rejected the idea that a plaintiff could 
reasonably believe that harassment motivated by sexual orientation is 
prohibited.121 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hamner is 
the only one of the three decisions to predate Breeden, yet it is the only 
one to actually consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief in the 
illegality of the underlying harassment. Yet, the court’s analysis of that 
standard is arguably flawed, for two reasons. First, the court’s reasonable 
belief analysis was limited to whether Hamner reasonably believed sexu-
al orientation discrimination was illegal;122 it did not consider whether 
Hamner could have reasonably believed that the sexual orientation dis-
crimination he endured was actually, or also, discrimination because of 
sex—an omission made more blameworthy by the fact that the doctor’s 
teasing included imitating the voice and gestures of stereotyped effemi-
nate men.123 The second flaw of the Hamner decision is that, when read 
together with Breeden, it leaves nothing left of reasonable belief and 
effectively requires the plaintiff to prove the illegality of the predicate 
discrimination.124 In Breeden, the Court detected an unreasonable belief 
based on the insufficient degree of harassment rather than its type.125 If 
  
 117. Id. at 706–07. 
 118. Id. at 707. 
 119. Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F. App’x 344, 351 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 120. Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n., 432 Fed. App’x 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 121. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 706–07. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of reasonable belief has not changed since Breeden, as 
more recent decisions have relied on Hamner for the principle that “[t]he objective reasonableness of 
the belief is not assessed by examining whether the conduct was persistent or severe enough to be 
unlawful, but merely whether it falls into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute.” Magyar 
v. Saint Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Hamm v. Weyauwega 
Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting retaliation claim of a heterosexual 
male plaintiff who complained about same-sex harassment that the court determined was not action-
able). 
 125. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001). 
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mistakes of type are also excluded from reasonable belief, as the Seventh 
Circuit appears to hold, there is hardly anything left for a harassed em-
ployee to be reasonably mistaken about—a result that Breeden itself 
forecloses.  
E. Judicial Decisions Affirming Gay Plaintiffs’ Reasonable Belief 
Two courts have found in favor of gay plaintiffs seeking to advance 
retaliation claims based on predicate discrimination that turned out not to 
be unlawful under Title VII. In Dawson v. Entek International,126 the 
plaintiff appealed the lower court’s dismissal of both his hostile-
environment sexual harassment claim and his claim that the employer 
terminated him in retaliation for reporting the harassment.127 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff had not alleged action-
able sexual harassment because “Dawson presented no evidence that he 
failed to conform to a gender stereotype” and even testified himself that 
he “does not exhibit effeminate traits.”128 Nevertheless, the court re-
versed the lower court’s dismissal of his retaliation claim.129 Without 
expressly addressing the reasonable belief standard, the court concluded 
simply that “Dawson engaged in protected activity when he visited [a 
person] in human resources to discuss his treatment and file a complaint. 
This was a complaint to human resources staff based directly on sexual 
orientation discrimination.”130 Though the analysis is sparse, the court 
seemed to have considered the plaintiff’s belief that Title VII prohibits 
sexual orientation discrimination to be a reasonable one. 
In a later decision applying Dawson, a federal district court in Cali-
fornia suggests as much. In that case, McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobac-
co Co.,131 two employees prevailed at trial on a claim that their employer 
took adverse action against them after they complained about sexual har-
assment as well as the harassment of their gay co-worker.132 The em-
ployer challenged the jury instruction, which defined activity protected 
from retaliation as “complaining to the defendant . . . based on the plain-
tiff's reasonable belief that her employer was engaged in unlawful con-
duct, which includes subjecting an employee to a sexually hostile work 
environment or discriminating against an employee on account of race, 
age, sex, or sexual orientation.”133 Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Dawson, the court affirmed that the jury was properly instructed 
to consider complaints about sexual orientation to be protected activity 
  
 126. 630 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 127. Id. at 932. 
 128. Id. at 937. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 936. 
 131. No. CIV. 2:09–2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 4006634 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011). 
 132. Id. at *1. 
 133. Id. at *3. 
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for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.134 In so doing, the 
court supplied some of the missing analysis that would have made the 
Dawson decision more clear. In particular, the court raised and applied 
the reasonable belief standard: 
There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiffs in this case 
were reasonable in believing that Title VII prohibited defend-
ant from terminating their coworker based on his sexual orien-
tation. Not only has there been a growing gay rights movement 
in this country, the courts have also recognized sexual orienta-
tion as a status that merits heightened protection. Accordingly, 
based on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dawson and because 
plaintiffs were reasonable in believing that Title VII prohibited 
defendant from discriminating based on sexual orientation, the 
court’s inclusion of “sexual orientation” in Instruction No. 11 
was a correct statement of the law and does not merit a new 
trial.135 
In support of the second sentence quoted above, the court cited ju-
dicial decisions ruling in favor of same-sex marriage and narrowing the 
Defense of Marriage Act, law review articles arguing for expansive defi-
nitions of sexual harassment under Title VII that would include sexual 
orientation discrimination, provisions of California law that prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and federal regulatory 
policy construing the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to include dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.136 This decision is a prom-
ising example of how courts could construe reasonable belief, and it will 
serve as a foundation for some of the arguments provided in the next 
Part.  
In addition to these two cases affirming that complaining about anti-
LGBT harassment is protected conduct, there have also been decisions 
where the courts assumed arguendo that was the case. While not as use-
ful to LGBT plaintiffs as Dawson or McCarthy, these decisions are at 
least worth noting for the mere fact that even outside of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, some courts, unlike those in Larson and Gilbert, refrain from casu-
ally restricting the scope of protected conduct to exclude discrimination 
reported by LGBT plaintiffs. In one such case, a federal district court in 
New York cited the reasonable belief standard as the basis for its as-
sumption that a lesbian plaintiff’s complaints were protected from retali-
ation under Title VII, even where the court had already determined that 
the predicate harassment was itself not actionable.137 The court preferred 
  
 134. Id. at *3–4. 
 135. Id. at *4 (footnote omitted). 
 136. Id. at *4 n.5. 
 137. Jantz v. Emblem Health, No. 10 Civ. 6076(PKC), 2012 WL 370297, at *13 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 6, 2012). Though the plaintiff alleged that she was targeted for harassment because of her 
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instead to grant summary judgment on other grounds, namely, that she 
had not proffered sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the 
protected activity and her eventual termination.138 Similarly, a federal 
court in Alabama assumed for argument’s sake that a transgender plain-
tiff’s complaint about sex discrimination amounted to protected con-
duct,139 even though the sex discrimination claim itself had been dis-
missed for lack of sufficient evidence from which to construe bias.140 
Here, too, the retaliation claim failed on other grounds.141 
III. TOWARDS A MORE ROBUST ANALYSIS OF LGBT PLAINTIFFS’ 
REASONABLE BELIEFS 
Discrimination against LGBT employees is a pervasive problem 
that advocates should challenge by all available means. Political efforts 
aimed at persuading Congress to pass a federal law that prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity142 will, when successful, largely close the gap that leaves LGBT 
Americans vulnerable to discrimination under federal law.143 In the 
  
failure to conform to gender stereotypes in her attraction to and relationship with a female partner, 
the court construed this as sexual orientation discrimination not actionable under Title VII. Id. at *7. 
 138. Id. at *7. 
 139. Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1301 (N.D. Ala. 2013); see also 
Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899, at *10 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (“It is 
undisputed that the Plaintiff [who complained about sex discrimination related to her gender transi-
tion] engaged in protected activity.”). 
 140. Parris, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1301. 
 141. Id. at 1312. 
 142. The latest version of the perennially-proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA) would do exactly that. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th 
Cong. § 4(a) (2013), which states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individ-
ual, because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Id.  
 143. “Largely” refers to the strong possibility that Congress would pass a version of ENDA 
that exempts religious organizations, or possibly even secular employers with a religious objection, 
from having to comply. Indeed, the recent version of ENDA passed by the Senate contained an 
exemption for religious organizations, though an amendment that would have expanded the exemp-
tion to include objecting secular employers failed to pass. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 
2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6; Ramsey Cox, Senate Passes ENDA Amendment Designed to Protect 
Churches, THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/189434-
senate-adopts-amendment-to-enda-aimed-at-protecting-churches. In contrast, Title VII only permits 
such employers to discriminate against non-ministerial employees on the basis of religion, not on the 
basis of other protected characteristics (the ministerial exemption, in contrast, applies to discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion and other protected characteristics). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) 
(“This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, 
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of 
its activities.”); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012) (recognizing religious institution’s exemption from antidiscrimination laws in the hiring of 
those it deems to be ministers). Should any version of a religious exemption be included in the 
version of ENDA that ultimately becomes law, Title VII would remain the only federal law poten-
tially available to LGBT non-ministerial employees to challenge discrimination by religious em-
ployers who are exempt from ENDA. 
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meantime, of course, advocates can also employ a litigation strategy that 
seeks to incrementally expand courts’ interpretation of sex discrimination 
covered by Title VII. At the same time, advocates should not ignore op-
portunities to also push back on the courts’ narrowing protection against 
retaliation for LGBT employees who reasonably believe that discrimina-
tion they have suffered is unlawful.144 By pushing equally hard on retal-
iation claims, advocates increase a client’s chances of obtaining some 
relief. Additionally, the success of such efforts would strengthen the 
law’s protection against retaliation, which in turn could motivate LGBT 
employees to speak up about discrimination on the job. Such whistle-
blowing is the crucial precursor to litigation that continues to push for 
robust interpretations of sex discrimination under Title VII. It can also 
yield examples useful in the political arena to persuade Congress and 
those with influence that the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA) is necessary. In other words, it is worth pushing hard on retalia-
tion claims, not only for the individual litigant’s sake, but in the interest 
of supporting the efforts to challenge anti-LGBT discrimination on all 
respective fronts. The remainder of this Part will explore arguments that 
could be useful to this end. 
A. Employees Might Reasonably Believe That Discrimination Based on 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Is Already Prohibited by 
Federal Law 
When LGBT employees report that they have been the victim of un-
lawful harassment, they may be doing so on the basis of a mistaken, yet 
reasonable, belief that federal law bans discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity. Indeed, surveys show that such protec-
tions are not only favored by a majority of Americans, but they are also 
widely assumed to already exist.145 As the federal district court noted in 
McCarthy, this belief seems reasonable when viewed against the back-
drop of LGBT (particularly lesbian and gay) victories in the courts and in 
  
 144. Cf. Kiley v. Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed. App’x 107, 108 
(2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff who lost on sexual orientation and sex stereotyping claim did not even 
appeal dismissal of his retaliation claim); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 n.1 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (Vickers “fail[ed] to make any argument regarding his Title VII retaliation claim,” so 
therefore it was waived). 
 145. A survey by the Center for American Progress found that “9 of out [sic] 10 voters errone-
ously think that a federal law is already in place protecting gay and transgender people from work-
place discrimination.” Krehely, supra note 10; see also Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex 
to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 210–11 (2012). In her article Schwartz states: 
[A] 2007 poll found that only one-third of American adults were aware that federal 
law . . . does not provide protection for employees on the basis of sexual orientation. At 
the same time, public opinion polls suggest that Americans do not find the idea of protec-
tion against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation particularly contro-
versial. A 2008 Gallup poll found that support for homosexuals having equal rights in job 
opportunities has jumped from fifty-six percent in 1977 to eighty-nine percent. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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the political arena.146 Marriage equality is arguably a more controversial 
prospect than employment nondiscrimination, so the fact that same-sex 
marriage is now legal in a majority of states (thirty-six as of this writ-
ing)147—as well as recognized for purposes of federal law148—could real-
istically contribute to the public perception that equality in the workplace 
is at least as secure. In the context of employment, LGBT rights are also 
on the rise. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia ban employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of either sexual orientation or gender 
identity, as do more than two hundred cities and counties.149 Additional-
ly, in 2011 Congress repealed the most notorious example of pervasive 
employment discrimination against gays and lesbians—the military’s 
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy.150 The widespread erroneous belief in fed-
eral protection against harassment of gay workers could even partially 
derive from the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale,151 which did not 
involve a gay plaintiff but was widely reported as a gay-rights victory.152 
At the same time, news of courtroom victories for LGBT plaintiffs such 
as Diane Schroer does not necessarily emphasize the nuances of the 
judge’s sex discrimination rationale,153 which could also lead the general 
public to erroneously believe the law protects gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender individuals by virtue of their status as such.154 
As the district court decision in McCarthy shows, it is possible for 
courts to accept that a whistleblower reasonably believes that federal law 
prohibits status-based discrimination against LGBT workers based on 
these examples of momentum in the gay-rights movement, both in the 
employment context and in general. Polling data about the public’s mis-
taken belief that such laws already exists makes this argument even 
stronger.155 Its weakness, however, is that it requires courts to accept 
what I will call a “categorical mistake” (believing a certain category of 
discrimination is prohibited when it is not) as a reasonable belief, which 
  
 146. McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIV. 2:09–2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 
4006634, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011). 
 147. See Same Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 19, 
2015). 
 148. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–93 (2013). 
 149. Pizer et al., supra note 1, at 755, 757. 
 150. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 
3515, 3516 (2010). 
 151. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see supra Part I.C. 
 152. E.g., Joan Biskupic, Same-Sex Harassment Is a No-No, Says Court; Landmark Ruling 
Covers Situations with Both Gay and Non-Gay Participants, MOBILE REG., Mar. 5, 1998, at 1A; 
Richard Carelli, Same-Sex Harassing Is Illegal: Employer, Gay-Rights Groups Praise Supreme 
Court Ruling, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 5, 1998, at 1A; David Jackson, Court Ruling on Same-
Sex Harassment Also Victory for Gay, Lesbian Workers, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 5, 1998. 
 153. Jesse J. Holland, Judge Rules Transgender Discrimination Is Illegal, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark), Sept. 20, 2008, at 16; Former Army Commander Wins Transgender Lawsuit, TIMES 
UNION (Albany), Sept. 20, 2008, at 5. 
 154. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1494 (“Moreover, employees’ understandings of what constitutes 
harassment will be shaped in large part by media accounts.”). 
 155. See supra note 145. 
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some courts have already refused to do.156 This tendency, however, de-
monstrably undermines Title VII enforcement. For the reasonable belief 
doctrine to mean anything at all, it has to allow whistleblowers to make 
some kinds of mistakes about the legal status of predicate discrimination. 
Especially where courts also insist on rejecting reasonable mistakes 
about the pervasiveness that harassment must reach to be actionable, 
rejecting reasonable categorical mistakes leaves effectively nothing left 
for an employee to be reasonably mistaken about. This result would evis-
cerate a doctrine that is both longstanding and that enjoys the apparent 
endorsement of the Supreme Court,157 and ought to be challenged as 
such. 
B. Employees Might Reasonably Believe That Anti-LGBT Discrimination 
Is Also Prohibited Sex Discrimination 
When LGBT plaintiffs report harassment or other discrimination 
that turns out not to be unlawful, they could also reasonably be mistaken 
in believing that they were complaining about actionable sex discrimina-
tion. This is because when targeted for discrimination, sex, gender, and 
sexual orientation are often, and reasonably, conflated. Sex is widely 
understood to refer to one’s anatomical status as male or female.158 Gen-
der is the socially-prescribed roles associated with sex, i.e., attributes that 
are masculine or feminine.159 Sexual orientation is an individual’s sexual 
or romantic attraction to either members of the same, other, or both sex-
es.160 To say that sex and gender are conflated in our culture is to say that 
society generally expects one’s anatomical sex to forecast much about an 
individual’s behavior, personality, appearance, interests, and qualities. 
Sexual orientation is also conflated with both sex and gender. Society 
expects those of the male sex to be sexually attracted to those of the fe-
male sex; heterosexuality is part of what it is to be masculine.161 If socie-
ty conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation, then one could reasona-
ble perceive that the mindset of a discriminating employer likely follows 
suit. 
To put this more concretely, imagine a hypothetical gay employee. 
He complains to his employer about co-workers who harass him verbally 
and physically, regularly calling him a faggot. Whether or not this com-
plaint is protected from retaliation depends on whether he reasonably 
believes the harassment to be motivated by gender nonconformity. Of 
course, the co-workers’ use of the word “faggot” implies animus towards 
  
 156. See supra note 85 and Part II.D. 
 157. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). 
 158. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender 
& Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 164 (1996). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
187, 196. 
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his sexual orientation, which the courts do not see as synonymous with 
gender.162 But the employee may still reasonably perceive that his mas-
culinity is ultimately, or simultaneously, the target. Because he does not 
date and sleep with women, his masculinity does not measure up to his 
co-workers’ expectations about the male sex. To him, this situation may 
be as much about gender as harassment mocking him for effeminate 
mannerisms. Because it is only courts’ esoteric concerns about “boot-
strapping” that keep them from reading Price Waterhouse to prohibit the 
“faggot” situation as well as the harassment based on his effeminate  
mannerisms, they should forgive the average employee who has not read 
the case law for not intuiting this distinction. 
1. Reasonableness Supported by Social Science Research 
Social science research validates the reasonableness of viewing an-
ti-gay harassment as a means of policing gender. Sociologist Michael 
Kimmel, for example, describes homophobia as a “central organizing 
principle of our cultural definition of manhood.”163 In our patriarchal 
society, men ascribe power to themselves by calling out other men’s 
gender nonconformity—an act that reaffirms their own compliance with 
“hegemonic” masculinity, the version of masculinity that is most power-
ful in society.164 Hegemonic masculinity requires the “relentless repudia-
tion of the feminine,” including, perhaps especially, the “feminine” sexu-
al practice of having or desiring sex with men.165 Anti-gay harassment, 
then, is a tool for generating and assigning male privilege.166 
Researchers have confirmed that heterosexual men’s negative atti-
tudes about homosexuality derive from its perceived threat to their mas-
culinity, rather than aversion to homosexual orientation per se.167 The 
connection between masculinity and homonegativity can also be seen in 
research documenting heterosexual men’s (but not heterosexual wom-
  
 162. See supra note 36. 
 163. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Con-
struction of Gender Identity, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES 119, 131 (Harry Brod & Michael 
Kaufman eds., 1994). 
 164. See id. at 124–25, 131. 
 165. Id. at 125. 
 166. Id. at 131–32; see also MICHAEL A. MESSNER, TAKING THE FIELD: WOMEN, MEN, AND 
SPORTS 67–68 (2002); C.J. PASCOE, DUDE, YOU’RE A FAG: MASCULINITY AND SEXUALITY IN HIGH 
SCHOOL 52–83 (2007). 
 167. Michelle Davies, Correlates of Negative Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Sexism, Male Role 
Norms, and Male Sexuality, 41 J. SEX RES. 259, 259 (2004); Scott W. Keiller, Masculine Norms as 
Correlates of Heterosexual Men’s Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 11 PSYCHOL. 
MEN & MASCULINITY 38, 48 (2010). 
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en’s) less favorable view of gay men than lesbians,168 and the disparaging 
of effeminate gay men within the gay-male community.169  
2. Reasonableness Supported by Dicta of a Federal District Court 
In addition to scientific authority, legal authority also sometimes 
recognizes the inherent interrelation of sexual orientation, gender, and 
sex—further marking as “reasonable” an employee’s impression of anti-
gay harassment being motivated by gender. In Centola v. Potter,170 a 
federal district court in Massachusetts held in favor of a gay-male em-
ployee whose co-workers used anti-gay slurs and teased him about being 
gay.171 Though holding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence 
that he was targeted for gender-nonconforming appearance and behavior, 
the court went on to say: 
The gender stereotype at work here is that “real” men should date 
women, and not other men. Conceivably, a plaintiff who is perceived 
by his harassers as stereotypically masculine in every way except for 
his actual or perceived sexual orientation could maintain a Title VII 
cause of action alleging sexual harassment because of his sex due to 
his failure to conform with sexual stereotypes about what “real” men 
do or don’t do.172 
To be sure, the dicta quoted here, over ten years old, still represents an 
extreme minority view among the federal courts, which generally do not 
view homosexuality as a gender nonconformity for purposes of applying 
Title VII.173 But the fact that it has not convinced the majority of courts 
to recognize anti-gay harassment as sex discrimination does not foreclose 
its value in retaliation cases by serving as a testament to the reasonable-
ness of that belief.174  
  
 168. Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Prejudice and Gender: Do Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward 
Lesbians and Gay Men Differ?, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 251, 255 (2000). 
 169. Francisco J. Sánchez & Eric Vilain, “Straight-Acting Gays”: The Relationship Between 
Masculine Consciousness, Anti-Effeminacy, and Negative Gay Identity, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 111, 112 (2012).  
 170. 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 171. Id. at 407. 
 172. Id. at 410 (footnote omitted). It is also worth noting that the Centola court also went on to 
consider the plaintiff’s retaliation claim and, in that context, persuasively dispensed with the em-
ployer’s argument that the employee had not engaged in protected conduct because he did not call it 
sexual harassment when he reported it. Id. at 412. It was enough to the court that the plaintiff “pre-
sented to his employers . . . events that, viewed in the light most favorable to him, constituted dis-
crimination against him on the basis of his sex due to sexual stereotyping.” Id. 
 173. Though, it was cited recently by a federal district court in Virginia, which rejected a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss a Title VII case involving anti-gay harassment. Henderson v. Labor 
Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2013) (citing Cento-
la, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 408–09). 
 174. See Gorod, supra note 77, at 1495–96 (“If the courts cannot agree, how are the individual 
citizens supposed to know?”). 
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3. Reasonableness Supported by the Emerging Position of the 
EEOC 
In further support of the reasonableness of an employee’s belief that 
Title VII prohibits anti-LGBT discrimination, the EEOC has signaled 
that it, too, shares this belief. For one thing, the EEOC’s interpretation of 
sex discrimination in Macy should not only support the reasonableness of 
any transgender plaintiff’s belief that discrimination is actionable, it is 
also broad enough to permit the conclusion that homosexuality, too, is 
protected from discrimination under Title VII. For one thing, the EEOC 
endorsed a broad reading of Price Waterhouse that “gender discrimina-
tion occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently for fail-
ing to conform to any gender-based expectations or norms.”175 The 
EEOC did not say “only those gender-based expectations or norms relat-
ed to how the employee behaves or appears in the workplace.”176 Addi-
tionally, the EEOC broadly read Price Waterhouse’s admonition that “an 
employer may not take gender into account in making an employment 
decision” to provide another reason, in addition to sex stereotyping, why 
transgender discrimination is actionable sex discrimination.177 An em-
ployer who discriminates against a gay or lesbian employee is taking 
gender into account in an equally broad way, in that the employer is con-
sidering the gender of the employee relative to the gender of the person 
to whom he or she is sexually attracted.178 
The EEOC spells this connection out more expressly in two sepa-
rate, nonbinding decisions from 2011. In one, a gay employee filed a 
complaint against his employer, the Postal Service, to challenge harass-
ment by his co-workers that stemmed from the public announcement of 
his wedding to another man.179 The agency concluded that the employee 
stated a claim of plausible sex discrimination because he essentially ar-
gued that the harassment was motivated “by [the harassing co-worker’s] 
attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in marriage.”180 In the other 
case, the EEOC determined that a lesbian employee, chided by her man-
ager about her presumed sexual practices, had stated an actionable claim 
for sexual harassment, having “alleged that [the manager’s] comment 
  
 175. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012). 
 176. Of course, as discussed in the text at notes 34–35, supra, this position conflicts with that 
of courts like the Sixth Circuit, which has expressly limited gender nonconformity protected from 
discrimination under Title IX to that which is observable at work. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 
453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 177. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. Perkins, supra note 67, at 440–41. 
 179. Veretto v. Donahoe, No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 1, 2011). 
 180. Id. at *3. 
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was motivated by his attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in rela-
tionships.”181 
The EEOC position may eventually influence the courts to view 
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination. Mean-
while, however, it should also be cited in support of LGBT plaintiffs’ 
reasonable belief in the interconnected nature of discrimination targeting 
sex, gender, and sexual orientation for purposes of sustaining a retalia-
tion claim.  
CONCLUSION 
Until Congress enumerates sexual orientation and gender identity as 
characteristics protected from employment discrimination, LGBT work-
ers who experience status-based discrimination on the job must allege 
sex discrimination in order to gain relief under federal law. This ap-
proach is inherently limited by courts’ insistence that sex discrimination 
should not subsume all discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
or gender identity. As advocates continue to push back against this re-
strictive approach, they should also make vigorous arguments in support 
of employees’ attendant retaliation claims. Though courts do not always 
apply it faithfully, the reasonable belief doctrine ensures that retaliation 
plaintiffs’ success does not turn on whether they were technically correct 
that the predicate discrimination was unlawful. Given, then, that retalia-
tion plaintiffs are allowed to be reasonably mistaken, mistakes about the 
legal status of discrimination against LGBT employees are good candi-
dates for the label “reasonable.” Aside from reasonably believing that 
sexual orientation and transgender status are protected in their own right, 
the interrelatedness of sex, gender, and sexual orientation support a rea-
sonable belief that the challenged discrimination is sufficiently gender-
related to warrant protection. Because there are so many arguments in 
support of a reasonable mistake about the legal status of anti-LGBT dis-
crimination, these cases make an excellent vehicle to remind courts of 
the proper application of reasonable belief doctrine. When these argu-
ments succeed, the retaliation doctrine will afford LGBT plaintiffs the 
protection they need to more aggressively report discrimination when it 
occurs. These reports, in turn, will help generate the case law necessary 
to push back on the limited definition of sex discrimination and support 
the political efforts to pass statutory protections for sexual orientation 
and gender identity discrimination. 
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